



GMUNC

Conference Information

GMUNC will be held in person on **October 21st**. For more information about the conference, please visit the GMUNC website at gmunc.weebly.com. Delegates can find guidelines for position papers at the website. The deadline for the position papers is **October 1st**. Any submission before the due date is eligible for all awards given out by the conference. **October 7th** is the deadline for position papers in order to be considered for any committee awards (not research awards). When submitting a position paper, please title the email as “[Delegate Name] Position Paper Submission”. If titled differently, keep in mind that the submission may be disregarded and not considered for any award. If delegates are in need of an extension for position paper deadlines, would like to submit their position papers, or have questions or concerns, please contact: irancrisishostage@gmail.com

Chair Bios

Head Chair: Yoonseo Lee

Yoonseo is a junior at Gunn High School and is excited to serve as Head Chair for GMUNC, a conference she has attended as a delegate herself. Currently, she is the USG of Gunn Model UN and has participated in the club since sixth grade. She enjoyed hosting Gunn MUN's first ever summer camp this year and volunteering at the middle school outreach programs. Outside of MUN, you can find Yoonseo coaching or playing on her tennis team! She looks forward to meeting all delegates at GMUNC soon.

Co-Chair: Suya Shen

Suya is a senior at Gunn High School and is looking forward to serving as Co-Chair. They have an interest in political sciences and have been participating in student government and MUN since 9th grade. Outside of MUN, Suya enjoys artistic endeavors and martial arts.

Letter from Chairs:

Dear Delegates,

At this conference, you will represent a delegation of the U.S, Iran, or a third nation, covering the consequences of the Iranian Hostage Crisis. GMUNC welcomes delegates of all skill levels, and a review of standard parliamentary procedures will take place at the beginning of the committee. Remember that GMUNC is a novice conference so make sure you are contributing to the committee and collaborating with other delegates. Remember to consider your delegation's stance through plenty of research and think about potential plans you would like to discuss throughout the conference. Most importantly, we hope you have a fun and engaging experience as well!

As delegates take action in the "front room," keep in mind that this is a **specialized committee** with crisis updates provided from the "back room" that may influence the delegates significantly. These updates will encourage the committee to tackle pressing issues in a timely manner and acknowledge how any action taken in committee can affect the problems that may occur.

We hope that all delegates will enjoy the conference and get a deeper knowledge on the Iran Hostage Crisis. Delegates must be prepared to compromise and face challenging discussions in these unprecedented and urgent times.

If you have questions regarding how to write your position paper, conference information or any general questions, please don't hesitate to reach out to us at

irancrisishostage@gmail.com.

Warm regards,

Yoonseo Lee & Suya Shen

Background Info:

This committee is set moments after the advent of the Iranian Hostage Crisis, originally lasting from 4th of November, 1979 to 20th of January, 1981. As the most profound crisis during the Carter presidency, the U.S government was committed to the safe return of hostages while minimizing the damages to American interests and prestige. Following the reign of The Shah in 1953, the U.S pledged to support the prevention of the nationalization of Iran's oil. In return, the U.S would receive steady supplies of oil while The Shah would enjoy billions of dollars invested into military assistance. In the early 1960s, The Shah pursued unpopular social and economic reforms from the nationalists that seemingly "westernized" Iran.

America has a legacy of attempting to establish influence over Iran due to the country's plentiful oil reserves. Due to the anti-American sentiment backing the crisis, acquiescing to the demands of the hostage-takers will most likely be seen as a show of weakness or loss of imperialist control over the region. The United States will not be eager to harm its reputation by giving into the demands of the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line. As this was at that point the biggest and most organized hostage crisis in United States history, no reliable precedent has been established. Previous hostage crises such as the 1964 Huntsville prison siege, which lasted for 11 days, show an inclination toward retrieval by force.

Historically, the hostage crisis leads to four decades of declining political relationships. During this time of instability, the U.S has received assistance from foreign nations including Canada, Switzerland, and Algeria, to evacuate the American hostages successfully. American staff members who managed to flee sought asylum in foreign embassies. Foreign aid played a critical role in providing American diplomats a safe haven in Tehran through the issuing of passports, serving as negotiators, and planning for rescue. Delegates will have an opportunity to

lessen the damage to the relationship between the U.S and Iran while ensuring a rapid return of hostages in this committee.



The “Yellow Ribbon” welcomed hostages back from Iran and expressed gratitude for Canada’s role in the crisis

Historical Context:

The Iranian Hostage Crisis was a culmination of anti-American sentiments developed from the 1979 Islamic Revolution in addition to the decisions of President Jimmy Carter.

Not only did the Hostage Crisis deteriorate U.S-Iranian relations for decades, it also contributed to President Carter’s failure to be reelected for a second term.

In 1963, the U.S aided Iran in replacing the former elected prime minister with Muhammad Rizza Sha Palavi, also referred to as ‘The Shah’. He was generous to the U.S interest in Iranian oil, however, was known as a brutal dictator for the Savak, an infamous secret police that terrorized and tortured the public constantly. As opposition to The Shah grew, he fled with his family in January of 1979 never to return to Iran again.



Mohammad Reza, Shah of Iran, arrives on U.S soil in 1979

Ayatollah Rhomeini, the new leader of Iran and popular radical, took power in the spring of 1979 in the midst of the Iranian Revolution. Khomeini establishes a new government ensuring the people of Iran of more freedom. Opposingly, Khomeini enforces a militant form of government upon Iran after replacing the former administration.

A month after The Shah flees the country for Egypt, the U.S embassy in Iran is briefly occupied by Iranian guerrillas. U.S Ambassador William H. Sullivan along with approximately a hundred staff members were held hostage until freed by Khomeini's revolutionary forces. Upon the request of Khomeini to reduce U.S interference in Iran, Ambassador Sullivan limits embassy staff from 1,400 to 70 personnels.

The Shah continues to seek asylum from one country to another. After his cancer diagnosis, The Shah informs the U.S State Department that he seeks asylum for medical treatment only available in the United States. President Jimmy Carter expresses concerns to admit The Shah into U.S territory fearing the retaliation of the Iranian government. U.S authorities inform then Iranian prime minister, Mehdi Bazargan, to guarantee the safety of the U.S embassy and its staff.

However, under the pressure of statesmen Henry Kissinger and David Rockefeller, President Carter helps The Shah receive treatment in the New York Hospital in October of 1979. As expected, the Iranian Revolutionaries' anti-American sentiments grow immeasurably.

Past U.N Action:

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, signed by both Iran and the United States of America, grants near-total protection from another country's legal jurisdiction to diplomats, otherwise known as diplomatic immunity. Therefore, this diplomatic standoff can be considered a violation of international law.

Relations between the United States and Iran have previously been tolerable and therefore not of concern to the United Nations, up until the 1953 Iranian coup d'état. Previous to the coup, the United Nations had experienced oil conflicts between the United Kingdom and Iran, in which Iran nationalized their assets of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and attempted to eject British technicians from the Abadan oil fields. The UN ultimately rejected British demands for recompensation. This conflict is what resulted in the 1953 Iranian coup d'état, in which the United States and United Kingdom worked in tandem to remove the elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh from power and increase the rule of the more Western-inclined shah.

Historically, the UN utilizes political pressure during international crises as a means of forcing an outcome; the United Nations does not have a precedent of encouraging military action. Denial of support to Iran in further conflicts, such as the brewing Iran-Iraq War, and a refusal to recognize the revolutionary government can be expected from United Nations countries the longer the crisis is sustained. An upcoming United Nations Security Council meeting will also encourage Iran to expedite negotiations to prevent being sanctioned against. An

extended conflict is likely to tarnish the reputation of both involved countries; therefore, all sides are looking for a swift resolution.

Current Situation:

It is currently November 6th, 1979. Demonstrators have entered the U.S Embassy in Tehran, occupied it for 2 days, and taken 52 diplomats hostage at the Ambassador's residence. The provisional government of Iran, including Prime Minister Mehdi Bazaragan and his cabinet, have resigned, with political power taken by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. All defense treaties between Iran and the United States have been nullified. The action is the culmination of tensions between the United States and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.



[November 4th, 1979, U.S Embassy in Tehran](#)

The United States has repeatedly shown support for the Shah of Iran and has granted the overthrown Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi asylum due to health problems, refusing to deport him to Iran to stand trial. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard believes that The United States is against the Iranian Revolution.

The Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line demand that the overthrown shah be deported to Iran to stand trial in exchange for the safety of the hostages. The primary goal of the committee is to safely retrieve all 52 hostages and reestablish working relations with the revolutionary government. This may be accomplished through diplomacy or military intervention.

Iran does not have interest in holding the hostages for extended periods of time, as this may cause the state to be heavily sanctioned in the upcoming United Nations Security Council meeting. In addition, the Soviet-Afghan war is beginning in Iran's neighbor country Afghanistan, putting Iran in the unpleasant situation of possibly having negative relations with both global superpowers.

The United States, historically, does not often concede in hostage negotiations and does not have particular inclination to relent to the heavily anti-American government of the Revolution. Previously, the United States has supported operations such as the 1953 coup d'état in order to establish the monarchical rule of the shah, and will likely hesitate to give in to hostage-taker demands.

Proposed Solutions:

In the "front room," it will be your job as representatives working to resolve the Iranian Hostage Crisis. Delegates must resolve the most pressing issue of ensuring the safe retrieval of all American hostages taken by Iranian militants. Please consider the following:

- 1) Potential request for foreign assistance to defuse the mounting international diplomacy tensions between the revolutionary Iran and U.S Keep in mind that extending the crisis to

involve foreign aid may intensify the conflict even further. It may lead to the growth of alliances among nations that can enlarge the situation to an international scale.

- 2) Determine the amount of military and diplomatic intervention required to compensate for Iranian and American interests that can prevent the prolongation of the crisis.
- 3) Recognize that many American civilians are fleeing from the fear of persecution from the Iran government. Delegates must consider how to take precautionary measures to protect the American population who are unable to escape.
- 4) Address anti-Iranian sentiments that may rise in the U.S to develop potential terrorism towards the Muslim citizens. The committee must strive to maintain a consistent public image and reputation to prevent political and social turmoil.

Questions to Consider:

1. How will the measures taken during this crisis affect the precedent on future hostage crises?
2. How will the crisis influence the legitimacy of the Iranian revolutionary government?
3. How can both the United States and Iran reach a satisfying enough conclusion to ensure that such a conflict will not occur again in the future?
4. How will the committee ensure the safety of the hostages? Will adherence to diplomacy instead of military intervention aid in this?
5. What sentiments will the Americans develop towards the current administration handling the return of hostages?

List of Delegates

United States:

President: Jimmy Carter

Vice President: Walter Mondale

Secretary of State: Cyrus Vance

Secretary of the Treasury: George William Miller

Secretary of Defense: Harold Brown

Secretary of the Interior: Cecil D. Andrus

Secretary of Commerce: Juanita Morris Kreps

Secretary of Health and Human Services: Patricia Roberts Harris

Secretary of Energy: Charles W. Duncan, Jr.

U.S Representative to the United Nations: Donald F. McHenry

Attorney General: Benjamin R. Civiletti

National Security Advisor: Zbigniew Brzezinski

Deputy Secretary: Warren Christopher

Lieutenant General: James Benjamin Vaught

White House Counsel: Lloyd Cutler

Director of Central Intelligence: Admiral Stansfield Turner

CIA Technical Operations Officer: Antonio Joseph Mendez

CIA Operative: Professor Richard W. Cottam

Head of CNN: Ted Turner

Head of CBS: William Leonard Paley

Head of ABC: Leonard H. Goldenson

Iran:

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini

Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh

Foreign Minister Abolhassan Banisadr

Secretary General Mohammad Mousavi Khomeiniha

Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Foreign Affairs: Ebrahim Yazdi

Spokesperson of the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line: Masoumeh Ebtekar

Representative of Iranian State Television: Ali Larijani (referred to as Mary by foreign press)

Journalist/Hostagetaker: Abbas Abdi

Revolutionary Organizer: Mohsen Mirdamadi

Other:

Canadian Prime Minister: Joe Clark

Sudanese Prime Minister: Sadiq al-Mahdi

Algerian Prime Minister: Abdul Malek Sella

Algerian Ambassador to Iran: Abdelkader Ben Bella

Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs: Mohammed Yazid

Peruvian Ambassador: Ricardo Luna

Secretary-General of the United Nations: Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

French Ambassador to Iran: Jean-Claude Aime

French Ambassador: René de la Touanne

Irish Ambassador to Iran: Sean Donlon

Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs: Abdullah Al-Salem Al-Sabah

Sultan of Oman: Said bin Taimur

German Ambassador to Iran: Gerold von Braunmühl

Swedish Ambassador to Iran: Rolf Ekéus

Swiss Ambassador to Iran: Erik Lang

Swiss State Secretary: Edouard Brunner

Syrian Archbishop of Caesarea, Negotiator: Hilarion Capucci

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